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courts where a free and voluntary plea of guilty is held to constitute an
intelligent and competent waiver. It is submitted that should Carter
succeed in getting before the Supreme Court of the United States the
fact that he had no formal education, and was wholly unfamiliar with
court procedure, it will be held that he did not intelligently and com-
petently waive his right to counsel.
23
WILIA H. BURTON, JR.
Constitutional Law-Schools and School Districts-School Bus
Transportation for Parochial School Students
The United States Supreme Court, in Everson v. Board of Education
of Ewing Township,' held it not unconstitutional for a state to provide
transportation to students attending private schools. A New Jersey
statute2 authorized the boards of education of the school districts of
the state t6 make rules and contracts for the transportation of children
to and from school when the children lived remote from any school-
house. The statute specifically included transportation for school chil-
dren to and from school other than a public school, except such school
as is operated for profit in whole or in part. The township of Ewing
had no school past the eighth grade, after which grade children attended
schools in nearby communities. The township provided no transporta-
tion to the other schools but, pursuant to the statute, the school board
adopted a resolution recommending the transportation of pupils to three
public high schools and to Catholic schools by way of public carrier.8
In accordance with this resolution, the school board periodically reim-
bursed parents of children attending the three public high schools and
Catholic schools outside the township for fares expended for transporta-
tion. The plaintiff, as a district taxpayer, challenged the constitution-
ality of the statute and the resolution of the board of education pursuant
to it. The Court of Errors and Appeals, reversing4 the Supreme Court 5
"' The four dissenting justices stated that the record, with these facts included,
shows a denial of due process, although the majority withheld an opinion on this
point until such time as the question was properly before the court.
'- U. S. - , 67 Sup. Ct. 504, 91 L. ed. (Adv. Ops.) 472 (1947).
'NEW JERSEY LAws 1941, c. 191, p. 581; N. J. REv. STATS. 18:14-8 NJSA.
' (Italics supplied.) An interesting difference in viewpoints concerning this
resolution developed. Mr. Justice Black, for the majority, was of the opinion
that, since the appellant did not allege, and there was nothing in the record to show,
that there were any children in the township who attended or would have attended,
but for want of transportation, any but public and Catholic schools, the statute
and resolution would not be found unconstitutional on a postulate neither charged
nor proved but -which rested on nothing but a possibility. Mr. Justice Rutledge
was of the opinion that it could not be assumed that there were no such children,
but the resolution should be held discriminatory on its face unless it were posi-
tively shown that no other sects sought, or were available to receive, the same
advantages.
'133 N. J. L. 350, 44 A. (2d) 333 (1945).
132 N. J. L. 98, 39 A. (2d) 75 (1944).
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of the state by a majority of six to three, held that neither the statute
nor the resolution violated the Constitution.
From this decision the plaintiff appealed to the United States Su-
preme Court, alleging that the statute and resolution violated the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in that public funds were
used to carry out private purposes; and the First Amendment in that
the taxpayer was forced to contribute to the support and maintenance
of the schools dedicated to teach the Catholic Faith. The majority of
the court sustained the Court of Errors and Appeals. Four justices
dissented.6
The rationale of the court's opinion was that the New Jersey legis-
lature and highest court had concluded that a public need was to be
served by using the tax-raised funds to pay the bus fares of school
children,7 and the fact that the object of the law and the desires of those
most directly affected by the law coincided was an inadequate reason
for the court to say that the state legislature had erroneously appraised
the public need. Further, the legislation in question having been deter-
mined to be public welfare legislation, individual citizens could not be
excluded from its benefits because of their faith or lack of it. The
First Amendment prohibiting the establishment of a religion does not
make it more difficult for parochial or private schools to operate; and
it does not bar services such as this, "so separate and so indisputably
marked off from the religious function."
Every state has some form of compulsory educational statute re-
quiring parents, or those in control of children, to provide a suitable
education for them.0 It has been held that a statute compelling attend-
ance at public schools is an unreasonable interference with the liberty of
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing of their children.' 0 If
the private school meets the requirements of the law in the particular
state with respect to standards of education, the parent has the con-
stitutionally protected right to send his child to that school." Nor does
it seem that, in exercising this right to send his child to the school of
his preference, the parent, who is a citizen of the state, should be de-
prived of his participation in those benefits which may accrue to him
as a citizen.1
Justices Jackson, Rutledge, Frankfurter, Burton.
' Violation of the equal protection clause because of discrimination between
private schools not operated for profit and those operated for profit in whole or
in part was not urged by the appellant and had not been passed on in New Jersey;
hence, it was held to have no relevancy to any constitutional question presented.
'- U. S. - , 67 Sup. Ct. 504, 512, 91 L. ed. (Adv. Ops.) 472, 481 (1947).
' State v. Jackson, 71 N. H. 552, 53 A. 1021, 60 L. R. A. 739 (1902). See State
v. Wolf, 145 N. C. 440, 59 S. E. 40 (1907). See N. C. CoNsT., Art. IX, §11, and
N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §115-302.
10 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925).
"7Ibid. Cf. N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §115-302.
"7 See Chance v. Mississippi T. R. and P. Board, 190 Miss. 453, 467, 200 So.
706, 710 (1941).
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Therefore, the question to be answered is whether a citizen, by virtue
of his citizenship, may participate in an appropriation to transport chil-
dren to school. This question would seem answered by determining
whether such an appropriation is in furtherance of a public need. At
least fifteen states'3 have concluded that it is in furtherance of a public
need to see that all children, whatever school they attend, are transported
when necessary. The interest of the state in the health of the child
and in protecting him from the dangers of highway traffic on his way
to and from school in compliance with the compulsory educational
statute are matters of public concern. 14  But some states have held to
the contrary on the ground that carrying parochial school children to
school is giving aid to a religious organization. 15 However, the effect
of these decisions has been overcome in New York by constitutional
amendment,' 6 and in Kentucky by legislation which appropriated money
13 California, CAL. Eouc. CODE (Deering, 1944) §§16624, 16257, held constitu-
tional in Bowker v. Baker, 73 Cal. App. (2d) 653, 167 P. (2d) 256 (1946). Illinois,
ILT. ANN. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1936) Ch. 122 §128a. Indiana, IND. ANN. STAT.
(Burns, 1933) §28-2805. Kansas, KAN. GEN. STAT. (Corrick, Supp. 1943) §72-
606. Kentucky, Ch. 156, Acts 1944, held constitutional in Nichols v. Henry, 301
Ky. 434, 171 S. W. (2d) 963 (1946). Louisiana, LA. GEN. STAT. (Dart, 1939)
§2248. Maryland, Ch. 185, Laws 1937, held constitutional in Board of Education of
Baltimore County v. Wheat, 174 Md. 314, 199 A. 628 (1938), and in Adams v.
County Commissioners, 180 Md. 550, 26 A. (2d) 377 (1942). Massachusetts, c. 390.
STATS. 1936. Michigan, MIcH. STATS. ANN. (Henderson, 1937) §392, as amended
by Pub. Acts 1939, No. 38. Missouri, Mo. Rgv. STATS. ANN. (1939) §10326, as
amended by Laws 1939, p. 718. New Hampshire, N. H. Rav. LAws (1942) c. 135
§9. New Jersey, see notes 1 and 2 sapra. New York, N. Y. CoNsT. Art. XI, §4.
Oregon, Opa. CoMP. LAws ANN. (1940) §111-874. Washington, Chap. 141, Sec.
13, Laws of 1945, p. 399.
In two states, Mississippi and Louisiana, textbooks are provided for all school
children without regard to attendance at private or public schools. In Louisiana,
see Act No. 100 of 1928, held constitutional in Cochrane v. Louisiana State Board
of Education, 168 La. 1005, 123 So. 655 (1929) affirmed, 281 U. S. 370 (1930).
In Mississippi, see Chap. 202, Sec. 23, Laws 1940, held constitutional in Chance v.
Mississippi T. R. and P. Board, 190 Miss. 453, 200 So. 706 (1941). But cf. Smith
v. Donahue, 202 App. Div. 656, 195 N. Y. S. 715 (1922).
14 Board of Education v. Wheat, 174 Md. 314, 199 A. 628 (1938) ; Adams v.
County Commissioners, 180 Md. 550, 26 A. (2d) 377 (1942). See Bowker v.
Baker, 73 Cal. App. (2d) 653, 167 P. (2d) 256 (1946); Note (1938) 51 HARv. L.
REv. 935.
"5Judd v. Board of Education, 278 N. Y. 200, 15 N. E. (2d) 576, 118 A. L. R.
789 (1938); State ex rel. Traub v. Brown, 36 Del. 181, 172 AtI. 835 (1934):
Mitchell v. Consol. Sch. Dist., 17 Wash. (2d) 61, 135 P. (2d) 79, 146 A. L. R. 612
(1943); Gurney v. Ferguson, 190 Okla. 254, 122 P. (2d) 1002 (1941) ; Sherrard
v. Jefferson County Bd. of Ed., 294 Ky. 469, 171 S. W. (2d) 963 (1942); State
ex rel. Van Straten v. Milquet. 180 Wis. 109, 192 N. W. 392 (1923) ; cf. Hiebanja
v. Brewe, 58 S. D. 351, 236 N. W. 296 (1931); Schlitz v. Picton, 66 S. D. 301,
282 N. W. 519 (1938); but see Chance v. Mississippi T. R. and P. Board, 190
Miss. 453, 469, 200 So. 706, 710 (1941) where the court said, ". . . The freedom
inherent in the mutual independence of the church and the state includes the right
of the state to freedom from unwarranted hinderance in the name of religion.
Eternal vigilance is not exhibited by injecting false issues into a question which
concerns only the general welfare of all its citizens."
"6Judd v. Bd. of Ed., 278 N. Y. 200, 15 N. E. (2d) 576, 118 A. L. R. 789
(1938) held unconstitutional a statute designed to give transportation to all schools
-legally attended (Sec. 206 of Education Laws as amended by ch. 541 of the Laws
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from one fund rather than from another.17 Attempts have been made
in Washington and Wisconsin to overcome the effects of earlier deci-
sions by changing the language of applicable statutes.' 8 Thus the
majority opinion is amply supported by judicial precedent and legis-
lative action.
Indeed, it is difficult to understand how the court could have held
otherwise without in effect overruling its previous decisions. A parent
may comply with compulsory educational laws by sending his child to
a parochial school.' 0 The state may supply textbooks to all students
without regard to attendance at public or private schools, 20 on the basis
that the aid is to the student and not to the school. If there is a differ-
ence between supplying textbooks and furnishing transportation it would
seem to be one of words.
2 '
of 1936). Following this decision, the Constitution was amended to include "but
the legislature may provide for transportation to and from any school or institution
of learning." (N. Y. CONsT. Art. XI, §4.)
"In Sherrard v. Jefferson County Bd. of Ed., 294 Ky. 469, 171 S. W. (2d)
963 (1942) the court held appropriations from the public school fund unconstitu-
tional, whereupon the legislature enacted Ch. 156, 1944 Acts (Ky. REv. STAT.
158.115), permitting the county to supplement the school fund from the general
fund. This was held constitutional in Nichols v. Henry, 301 Ky. 434, 191 S. W.
(2d1 930 (1946).
Mitchell v. Consol. Sch. Dist., 17 Wash. (2d) 61, 135 P. (2d) 79 (1943)
held unconstitutional a provision, Chap. 51, Laws of 1941, p. 120, entitling parochial
and private school students to transportation when the school is along or near the
route designated by the school board. Expenses were to be taken from the per-
manent school fund. Four justices held the statute unconstitutional as an aid to
religion; four held that it was constitutional. Grady, J., in deciding with the
majority, affirmed the lower court on the ground that the statute was unconstitu-
tional only because the fund used was the school fund, when the Constitution
prohibited use of this fund for any purpose other than for common schools, and
not because it was in aid of religion. The legislature then enacted Chap. 141,
Sec. 13, Laws of 1945, p. 399, entitling all children attending school under the
compulsory school attendance law to use transportation facilities provided by the
school district in which they reside. It is not apparent to the writer how this
is to overcome the objection raised by Grady, J.
In Van Straten v. Milquet, 180 Wis. 109, 192 N. W. 392 (1923), the appropria-
tion was from the county general fund and was held unconstitutional. Amend-
ments were enacted to §4034 (1) Wis. STATS., to enable all children to be eligible
for transportation where found necessary. This statute was declared not to ex-
tend to parochial school students in 23 OIIioNS ATTORNEY-GENERAL of Wisconsin
622. However, in Ruts v. Marek, in a circuit court of the state, Wickham, Judge,
declared the statute did extend to parochial students. (ScHool, Bus TRANSPORTA-
TION LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES, by National Catholic Welfare Conference,
Legal Dept., p. 251 (1946)) Wisconsin defeated a proposal to amend the Consti-
tution to provide free transportation for private school students. N. Y. Times,
Nov. 7, 1946, p. 12, col. 5.
" See note 10 supra.
o Cochrane v. Louisiana State Bd. of Ed., 168 La. 1005, 123 So. 655 (1929);
affirmed, 281 U. S. 370 (1930); Chance v. Mississippi T. R. and P., 190 Miss.
453, 200 So. 706 (1941). In the Cochrane case, on appeal, the issue did not con-
cern the effect of the state's action with respect to the First Amendment but,
under the due process clause, whether the state was engaged in a private function.
Since the religious issue was brought up in the state court it must be considered to
have been waived on appeal.
2 In appellant's brief in the Cochrane case it was argued, "If the furnishing of
textbooks free is not considered an aid to such private schools, but as incidental
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One aspect of the case offers a field for future litigation, and de-
mands an investigation of the North Carolina Constitution22 and of
pertinent state statutes. 2  The principal case holds that the state cannot
exclude individuals, because of their faith or lack of it, from receiving
the benefits of public welfare legislation.24 Some of the court's language
indicates it will consider legislation to transport school children as pub-
lic welfare legislation.2 5  Yet the court declares that it does not mean
to intimate that a state cannot provide transportation only to children
attending public schools.2 6  It is possible that this question will be left
to the state's discretion and if the state does transport private school
children no one can be heard to complain. Nor can anyone complain if
transportation is not furnished. However, if a state provides trans-
portation for public school children, as is done in many states, the legis-
lature having determined that expenditures therefor fill a public need,
it is at least doubtful, under the present holding, whether the state may
discriminate against children attending non-profit private schools, with-
out encroaching upon the equal privileges guaranteed to all under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
MILES J. MCCORMICK.
Courts-Jury-Exclusion of Women from the Jury List
In Ballard v. United States,' a mother and son were convicted in
the Federal District Court in the Southern District of California for
to the state educational system, then it logically follows that . . their [the chil-
dren's] transportation to and from such schools could be paid ... " Cochrane v.
Louisiana State Bd. of Ed., 281 U. S. 370, 372 (1930).
2' N. C. CoNsT. Art. IX, §1: "Religion, morality, and knowledge being neces-
sary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of
education shall forever be encouraged." Art. IX, §4: "The proceeds . . . shall be
faithfully appropriated for establishing and maintaining in this state a system of
free public schools, and for no other uses and purposes whatsoever." Art. IX,
§11: "The General Assembly is hereby empowered to enact that every child ...
shall attend the public schools ... unless educated by other means."
2 N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §115-302: "Every parent, guardian or other person
in the state having charge or control of a child between the ages of seven and
sixteen, shall cause such child to attend school .... The term 'school' as used
in this section is defined to embrace all public schools and such private schools as
have tutors or teachers and curricula that are approved by the superintendent of
public instruction or the State Board of Education." §115-374: "The control and
management of all facilities for the transportation of public school children shall
be vested in the State of North Carolina under the direction and supervision of
the State Board of Education. . . The tax levying authorities in the various
counties of the state are authorized and empowered to provide in the capital outlay
budget adequate buildings and equipment for the storage of all school busses. .
The use of school busses shall be limited to the transportation of children to and
from school for the regularly organized school day."
2 Everson v. Ewing Township, - U. S. - , 67 Sup. Ct. 504, 512, 91 L.
ed. (Adv. Ops.) 472, 480 (1947).
U. S. - 67 Sup. Ct. 504, 513, 91 L. ed. (Adv. Ops.) 472, 481.
- U. S. ., 67 Sup. Ct. 504, 513, 91 L. ed. (Adv. Ops.) 472, 481.
U. S. - , 67 Sup. Ct. 504, 512, 91 L. ed. (Adv. Ops.) 472, 480.
- U. S. - , 67 Sup. Ct. 261, 91 L. ed. (Adv. Ops.) 195 (1946).
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